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Abstract 
Using an original dataset, we investigated the determinants of individual preferences over income 
redistribution in Japan. Although income level is negatively correlated with support for 
redistribution, it does not explain much; there are other important factors, which relate to 
dynamics and uncertainty such as income risk. Even after controlling for income, both risk-averse 
individuals and those who expect to be unemployed in the future favor greater redistribution. 
Interaction of aging and mobility proved important. Relatively poor elderly, who presumably 
have few prospects of upward mobility, strongly support greater redistribution, whereas younger 
people are less sympathetic to such a policy. 
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1  Studies on inequality, such as Tachibanaki (1998), Ishikawa (1999), and Sato (2000) among others, were published 
within a short period and attracted wide attention from researchers and the general public. 
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1. Introduction 
How do people perceive and evaluate economic inequality in society? In Japan, there has been a 
growing interest in income inequality among both the general public and academics.1 
Representative indices of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, have indeed exhibited a steady 
rise since around 1985. Economists have proposed several possible explanations for this trend, 
such as the aging of the population, technological development, the rise in unemployment, and 
changes in household structures (e.g., more double-income families and single-member 
households). On the other hand, throughout the 1990s, the extent of redistribution has declined, 
owing to the reduced progressiveness of income tax (Ohtake and Saito, 1999). Discussion of both 
positive and normative aspects of income differentials has not abated and continues to this day. 
At the same time, it is striking how little is known about the way the general public assesses 
the existing distribution of economic resources and related policies.2 For example, one may 
conjecture that the poor favor income redistribution policies, as their net income normally 
benefits from these policies. 
However, this view is too simple. Figure 1, which is based on our survey, shows how people’s 
preferences for greater income redistribution vary with their household income. Although 
disapproval of redistribution clearly increases with income, there is a sizeable percentage of 
people in the highest income quartile who approve of such policies. In addition, respondents in 
the lower income groups do not necessarily support greater redistribution.3 The percentage of 
“not support” in the first income quartile is as large as 41.9% (which turns out to be identical with 
the percentage of “support” in the fourth income quartile). 
It would be premature to conclude from this that people are not selfish, or lack the ability to 
compute personal payoffs. Benabou and Ok (2001) constructed a model in which currently poor 
                                                     
2  For instance, we find it difficult to explain why a keen interest in income inequality has become apparent only in the 
late 1990s, which was almost ten years after the time (the late 1980s) when the index of inequality started showing an 
upward trend. 
3  This also holds true when we use equivalent income scales instead, such as household income divided by the square 
root of the number of its members. 
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individuals may oppose redistribution because they consider the potential loss from redistributive 
policies should they become rich in the future. Benabou and Ok refer to this as the Prospect of 
Upward Mobility (POUM) Hypothesis. Conversely, the rich may not necessarily oppose 
redistribution. Using a dataset from Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) have shown that even 
those who are currently rich tend to support redistribution if they expect their welfare to fall. 
Using an original dataset, we attempt to reveal the determinants of individual preferences for 
income redistribution. We show that, although income is negatively correlated with support for 
redistribution, it does not explain very much; there are other important factors, which relate to 
dynamics and uncertainty such as income risk. For instance, even after controlling for income, 
risk-averse individuals and those who expect to be unemployed in the future show a strong 
tendency to support greater redistribution. 
It was not until recently that economists began extensive use of people’s subjective opinions in 
econometric analysis. Among current studies is one of people’s preferences over income 
distribution and policy. 
Redistributive policies normally entail a conflict of interests. Understanding the determinants 
of individual preferences over redistribution may provide interesting (and yet unexplored) policy 
implications. Furthermore, in a democratic state, the size of government as well as specific 
government policies must be determined in accordance with the preferences of its members. We 
expect our research to shed light on fundamental issues such as the origins of the welfare state and 
the minimal state, and why some countries have more equal income distribution than others.4 
We did not rely on an existing survey. Rather, we designed and conducted an original survey, 
which enabled us to analyze preferences over redistribution in several new ways. For instance, we 
have information on individual characteristics that are important from an economic point of view, 
                                                     
4  Classical economists, such as Ricard and Marx, believed that inequality could not persist in democracies. Yet this has 
not turned out to be the case, and the reasons are by no means obvious. “ [I]f equalization of the distribution of wealth is 
possible through the electoral process, and if it is in the interest of the large majority of people (as would appear to be 
the case since median wealth is far below mean wealth in all capitalist democracies), why is it not implemented through 
political action by rational citizens?” (Putterman et al., 1998) 
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including attitudes toward risk, time preference, subjective and objective social mobilities, many 
of which have not previously been available. Further, we asked detailed questions about income 
distribution from both positive and normative perspectives. We describe our dataset and variables 
in detail later. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the determinants 
of preferences over redistribution. In Section 3, we present the estimable model and explain our 
dataset. In Section 4, we report the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Determinants of Preferences Over Redistribution 
We list below a set of possible determinants of preferences over redistribution that will be tested 
in our empirical analysis. 
 
(1) Current income 
Under the standard assumption of self-interested economic agents in a static and deterministic 
environment, the poor should favor redistribution while the rich oppose it. Meltzer and Richards 
(1981) consider an economy that consists of individuals with varying productivity, upon which a 
linear income tax is levied, the rate of which is determined by majority voting. The government 
redistributes the revenue in a lump-sum manner. The voter with the median income is decisive, in 
that the tax rate he or she prefers is the one that is socially chosen. Voters with income below (resp. 
above) the income of the decisive voter demand more (resp. less) redistribution than does the 
median voter. The extent of redistribution (the tax rate) is increasing in the ratio of the mean 
income to the median income, so a society that has a larger percentage of poor people will have a 
more extensive redistribution. This static median-voter model is the benchmark for our study.5 Its 
prediction will be modified once we introduce dynamics and uncertainty into the picture, as 
                                                     
5 Strictly, the model we estimate is not the median voter model per se. Our dependent variable is an indicator of whether 
the respondent agrees to greater redistribution. This is probably a better way to test the essential idea of the median 
voter claim on redistribution. A direct test of the median voter model using electoral data in this context would face a 
difficulty from the outset, for, in reality, electoral politics concerns not only redistributive tax but several different 
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discussed below. 
 
(2) Expected income and social mobility 
In a dynamic setting, coupled with upward social mobility and persistent redistributive policies 
over a certain time period, agents’ expectations about future income will also matter: today’s poor 
who are confident of becoming rich in the future will be net losers from redistribution in the long 
run, so they may not agree to redistribution today. On the other hand, those who are currently well 
off may be less so in future, and to the extent that they perceive this, may well demand 
redistribution now. Benabou and Ok (2001) formalize this idea, which they call the Prospect of 
Upward Mobility (POUM) Hypothesis. Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) constructed an index of 
income mobility using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and tested the POUM hypothesis. 
They found a negative correlation between regional mobility and individual support for 
redistribution. Using a dataset from Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) showed that even those 
who are currently rich tend to support redistribution if they are expecting a decline in their 
welfare. 
 
(3) Income inequality 
If individual utility functions are such that people care about their relative position in society 
rather than their absolute level of personal income or consumption, greater inequality can make 
the poor (comparing themselves with the rich) unhappy, and the rich (comparing themselves with 
the poor) happy, and people will favor income redistribution policies accordingly.6 Some people 
may simply dislike inequality because it offends their sense of equity. Alesina, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2001) show that a person’s subjective well-being can be negatively affected by 
                                                                                                                                                           
issues (e.g., religion and racial policy) simultaneously. The multidimensionality of issues is a plausible reason why the 
prediction of the standard median voter model has failed in actuality (see Putterman et al., 1998). 
6  Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) studied the optimal income tax when individuals are concerned with relative as well as 
absolute income, and showed that the optimal tax rate could be much higher than those derived under the standard 
assumption that only absolute income matters. 
 5
greater income inequality if he or she holds leftist ideas. Another possibility is that people 
perceive greater inequality as a rise in income risk, and require more redistribution to prepare for 
this increased uncertainty. 
 
(4) Faith in equality of opportunities 
People may not approve of inequality if they feel that ‘equal opportunity for all’ is not guaranteed 
in society. Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) found that equality of opportunity is a necessary 
condition for Americans to see greater social mobility as a substitute to redistribution. 
 
(5) Past income, consumption and previous experience 
Individuals probably have an imperfect knowledge about the objective probability of upward or 
downward social mobility. Their own experiences may then serve as crucial information when 
they form perceptions about mobility. One’s personal history concerning income, employment, 
and educational background (one’s parents’ as well) can have an important influence on whether 
one is optimistic or pessimistic about one’s future, as well as how much faith one has in the 
equality of opportunity in the society. Piketty (1995) formalizes this type of idea in a Bayesian 
learning model. Empirical investigation by Alesina and La Ferrara (2001), and Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2000) confirmed this conjecture by finding past personal experiences important for the 
formation of opinions about income redistribution. 
 
(6) Risk aversion 
If an individual is uncertain about future income, risk aversion implies that he or she will be ready 
to give up some money to obtain a guaranteed income. The amount given up will be greater for 
those who are more risk averse, for whom income redistribution may be desirable as a social 
insurance against uncertainty, even though the current net benefit from such a policy is negative. 
Empirical studies have used a self-employment dummy as an inverse proxy for risk aversion. 
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Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) found that the self-employed do indeed oppose redistribution. The 
validity of this proxy has not been tested and is debatable. Our original survey enabled us to create 
two different, direct indices of risk aversion: one is the standard certainty equivalent, derived 
from a question on financial commodities. The other is obtained from the lowest percentage of 
rainfall in a weather forecast that makes the respondent take an umbrella with him or her when 
going out. 
 
(7) Age 
As one approaches retirement age, the prospect of moving up the income ladder is likely to 
decrease. At least, one has a shorter time left to do so. One would then perceive the degree of 
substitution between social mobility and income redistribution to be weaker, and one would come 
to favor redistribution. Such a positive correlation between age and support for more 
redistribution, if any, should be evident among lower-income earners, for it is they who currently 
benefit most from such a policy. At one extreme are the relatively poor, retired elderly who have 
no prospect of entering the labor market again (and therefore no possibility of experiencing 
upward mobility). Our hypothesis implies that the effects of age on support for greater 
redistribution should be positive and larger among these people than those for any other age and 
income group. An analysis of how age relates to preferences for redistribution is also of interest 
considering that Japan is an unusually rapidly aging society. 
 
(8) Prospect of unemployment 
Even after controlling for income and consumption, the anticipation of unemployment can 
influence one’s welfare and preference over income redistribution. Indeed, recent econometric 
analysis of subjective well-being showed that unemployment involves not only monetary loss but 
also various psychological shocks to the unemployed, such as the loss of self-confidence and of 
feelings of attachment to the workplace (Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004). 
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Nonfinancial costs of expected unemployment could therefore be a significant source of demand 
for social safety nets, including a greater redistribution policy. 
 
(9) Altruism 
This factor could be important in either a static or a dynamic environment. Even wealthy 
individuals may agree to redistribution solely on the basis of altruism if they see redistribution as 
a substitute for charity. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) suggest that while Europeans have 
greater public provision of welfare than Americans, the US has more private provision of welfare 
(voluntary donations) to the poor than do European countries, and one cannot attribute this to the 
differences in taxation systems. 
 
(10) Externalities and public goods 
Redistribution need not involve a conflict of interests, or a trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
It can be efficiency enhancing. Redistribution can compensate for capital-market imperfections 
(due to, say, high transaction costs or asymmetric information), and thus may have beneficial 
effects on economic efficiency (Barr, 1992, Boadway and Keen, 2000, Krueger, 2002). The rich 
may well understand public-good aspects of various policies, such as the need for state 
intervention in the provision of infrastructure and education in a well-functioning society. These 
policies have a redistributive consequence under a nonregressive taxation system. Greater 
poverty can give rise to social unrest or increased crime, from which the rich will have a greater 
fear of being injured parties. For these reasons the wealthy may, acting on their own self-interest, 
rationally vote for extensive redistribution. In addition, government intervention to offset these 
adverse externalities would be desirable as an efficient solution to the free-rider problem (social 
prisoner’s dilemma) that would prevail when redistribution is to be done through voluntary 
donations by the rich. 
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3. Econometric Model and Data 
3.1 Model and estimation strategy 
We assume that the preferences of individual i over redistribution policy can be described using 
the following latent variable model: 
Yi
* = Xiβ +Uiγ + Miλ + εi  (1) 
where Yi
*  is unobserved and takes a higher value the more individual i favors greater 
redistribution. iX  is a vector of individual characteristics such as gender, age, educational 
background, income, the degree of risk aversion, and the degree of altruism. iU  is a dummy that 
equals unity if the respondent experienced unemployment in the past five years. If the estimated 
coefficient of this variable is positive and large, one can conclude that those who have been 
unemployed in the recent past will vote for redistribution by the state. iM  is a binary variable that 
is unity when the respondent thinks that upward social mobility has recently increased. If λ  is 
negative, the interpretation is that social mobility and redistribution policy are substitutes. iε  is 
an error term. 
In practice, we do not observe *iY . We define a binary variable iY , which is unity if the 
respondent shows support for more redistribution, and zero otherwise.7 It also satisfies the 
following condition: 
iY 0= if *iY 0<  
iY 1=  if *0 iY≤  
                                                     
7 Both Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Alesina and La Ferarra (2001) use survey questions that ask whether the 
respondent supports income redistribution in general. This may be too general a question and leave ambiguity. We 
believe it is useful to be somewhat more specific and ask, as we did in our survey, whether the respondent prefers more 
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Assuming that iε  has a standard normal distribution and is independent of all the explanatory 
variables, probit estimation yields consistent estimates of the parameters. For statistical inference, 
we use cluster-robust standard errors to deal with the possible correlation of error terms within 
each cluster (due to some region-specific factor), while assuming no correlation across clusters. 
The appendix details variable definitions. 
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis, we describe our data and report some 
descriptive statistics. We designed a survey entitled “Survey on life and society”. The survey was 
administered between 13 and 26 February, 2002. The population comprised adults aged between 
20 and 65 in Japan. We sent the questionnaire to 6,000 persons selected at random. The number of 
respondents was 1,928, which corresponds to a response rate of 32.1%.8 Survey questions 
included those on the Japanese economy (such as the causes of rising unemployment, 
determinants of individual income levels, changes in income distribution, preferences over 
various government policies), the current status of the respondent (income, wealth, expected 
income, experience of unemployment, happiness, class consciousness), and other individual 
characteristics (gender, age, educational background, occupation). 
Our dependent variable is obtained from a question that asks whether the respondent supports 
or opposes “strengthening the redistribution of income from rich to poor using tax and other 
instruments of the social security system”. The respondent could choose from a 1 to 5 scale for 
“Support” to “Oppose”, with higher values indicating more support. From this, we created a 
binary variable that takes the value unity if the answer is favorable to redistribution and zero 
otherwise. We labeled this variable Redistr, and applied probit estimation. 
                                                                                                                                                           
or less redistribution than the current level, for in this way we know that the respondents share a common reference 
point. It also tells us whether they approve of the current extent of redistribution by the government. 
8  The response rate is rather high for a mail-based sampling procedure. Moreover, the authors have found relatively 
small biases in the distributions of age, gender and income in our dataset, compared with the census and a 
representative survey such as the Japanese General Social Survey. Nevertheless, the possibility that our respondents are 
nonrandom in some other characteristics remains. 
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In Tables 1 to 5, we present some descriptive statistics. Table 1 shows that approval of more 
redistribution is stronger in higher income groups. This is intuitively reasonable. However, it is 
also true that a significant proportion (about 40%) of people in the lowest income quartile do not 
agree to greater redistribution, and around 40% of people in the highest income quartile do. In this 
sense, the current net benefit from income redistribution explains little of people’s preferences 
over redistribution. In other words, a static median voter model with self-interested agents needs 
to be modified in some way. 
In Table 2, we report preferences for redistribution according to age groups. The aged are more 
supportive of such policies, although there appears to be a nonlinear relationship. Table 3 shows 
that men tend to support redistribution more than do women. Interestingly, this is in sharp contrast 
to the evidence from other developed countries. Table 4 indicates that the unemployed are very 
likely to support more redistribution. Table 5 contains basic descriptive statistics of all the 
variables used in our multivariate analysis. Many respondents are quite conscious of the recent 
changes in income distribution. For instance, the average value of a binary variable IncomeIneq 
is about 0.66, indicating that 66% of respondents think that income inequality has increased in the 
past five years. Similarly, the value of a dummy variable IncomeIneqFut implies that more than 
75% of respondents expected income inequality to increase in the coming five years. 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Basic model 
We begin with estimation of the effects of basic individual characteristics. Table 6 shows the 
estimated marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable, and their 
cluster-adjusted standard errors. 
In the first three rows, we look at the attitude across marital status and gender. The base group 
is married men. Females, especially married ones, turn out to favor redistribution less than do 
males. This contrasts with the findings in other developed countries. 
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Next, we examine the effects of age. If, probably after a certain point, aging makes upward 
income mobility less likely (the elderly, at least, have a shorter time period to achieve a given 
degree of social mobility than young people do), then under the POUM hypothesis discussed 
above, older people should be more supportive of redistribution than are younger people. 
Furthermore, this finding should apply to low-income groups because they enjoy a net current 
income gain from redistribution. 
The estimation results for the age dummies suggest that our conjecture is basically correct. 
The omitted category is for those in their twenties. Elderly people tend to be more favorable to 
greater redistribution, and this effect is very robust. Later we confirm that this result holds, as 
expected, only among lower-income groups. 
Neither higher education (the omitted category is “less than college”) nor real estate has any 
significant effect. On the other hand, those with larger household financial assets are less likely to 
accept redistribution. Similarly, higher household income is negatively correlated with support 
for redistribution (the base group is the first thirty percentile in terms of household income). 
These results on age, income and wealth suggest self-interested agents and are mostly consistent 
with what previous studies found in other developed countries. 
Two points are worth noting in passing. First, our finding that women oppose redistribution 
contrasts with that of Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) for the US, and that of Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2000) for Russia. Alesina and La Ferrara argue that women (along with blacks) tend to support 
more redistribution, possibly because they perceive a lack of equal opportunities for all in 
America. Edlund and Pande (2002) provide evidence that as a result of the recent rise in the 
divorce rate, more American women are facing a decline in welfare, which makes them support 
the Democratic Party. We have seen that women in Japan, married or not, actually appear to 
disapprove of greater redistribution.9 
                                                     
9  The same results hold for women with and without jobs; they are less likely to agree to greater redistribution than are 
men. Also, the estimated coefficient for female remains virtually identical whether we control for risk aversion 
(discussed in detail below) or not, so the significance of gender in our estimate represents something other than the 
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Secondly, previous studies also report the estimated impact of age on preferences. Ravallion 
and Lokshin (2000) show that, in Russia, the respondent’s age is positively correlated with 
support for redistribution, which is similar to our result. On the other hand, Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2001) found that age has a negative and significant coefficient. The difference is interesting but 
we have not been able to explain it. 
4.2 Risk aversion 
Various government policies with a redistributive consequence have a public-insurance aspect. 
People who are relatively risk-averse may therefore rationally demand more redistribution, even 
if they are currently affluent enough to incur a net loss from such policies. To test this hypothesis, 
we created a rather novel proxy for risk aversion using the answer to the following survey 
question: “What is the lowest percentage of rainfall forecast that usually makes you bring an 
umbrella with you?” To be specific, we defined an index of risk aversion, RiskAvs, as 1－(the 
respondent’s answer)/100. 
This index may vary widely across income groups, age groups, or by gender, but in a multiple 
regression, we can control for these factors. The overwhelming advantage of this index is that the 
original survey question is easy for respondents to understand and answer; it requires no special 
probability calculation. This is important, for most people are probably unfamiliar with 
calculating expected payoffs. On the other hand, most Japanese see weather forecasts in TV 
programs or newspapers everyday. In terms of simplicity, this is arguably the best available proxy 
for attitude towards risk. 
Table 6 shows that this index has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (at the 1% 
level). A 10% increase in risk aversion implies a 2% increase in the probability that the 
respondent considers more redistribution to be desirable. 
In our survey, we have a question from which another index of risk aversion (certainty 
                                                                                                                                                           
difference in attitudes toward risk. 
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equivalent) could be constructed. The original survey question goes as follows. You are thinking 
of choosing a pension scheme from two alternatives. One scheme ensures a constant monthly 
flow of benefits, while the other provides either 300,000Yen or 100,000Yen per month with an 
even chance. We then asked the respondent to report the smallest amount of sure monthly income 
in the first pension plan that would make him/her indifferent between the two plans. We treat the 
suggested amount as an index of risk aversion, which broadly accords with the textbook 
definition of certainty equivalent. After analyzing the data, however, we concluded that this 
variable is not a very useful index. Probably, the question was unfamiliar and not well understood 
by many respondents. For instance, in a linear probability model we performed instrumental 
variable estimations in which we use this certainty equivalent as an IV for another index that we 
constructed, RiskAvs, assuming the classical error variance setup (for this kind of multiple 
indicator solution to the measurement error problem, see e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 5.). We 
found that the coefficient of RiskAvs becomes statistically and economically insignificant. 
Conversely, when we instrumented the certainty equivalent measure by RiskAvs, we found the 
former’s coefficient to be insignificant. Considering that RiskAvs is robustly estimated to be 
significant in the usual OLS and probit estimations, the above results suggest that our certainty 
equivalent measure is not a good indicator of true risk aversion. Another possible and deeper 
reason why this index does not work is that the simple expected utility framework is inappropriate 
in this context. 
Empirical researchers (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001) often use a self-employment 
dummy as an inverse proxy for risk-aversion. Alesina and La Ferrara showed that the 
self-employed tend to oppose redistribution. We also examined the effect of self-employment. 
The estimated coefficient on our self-employment dummy is indeed negative but also small and 
not statistically significant. However, we found subsequently that the relatively rich 
self-employed respondents are rather negative about increasing income redistribution, and that 
this is true even after controlling for income and our index of risk aversion. Therefore, 
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self-employment probably represents something other than attitude towards risk (assuming our 
index of risk aversion is valid). Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) suggest that the self-employed may 
benefit less from redistributive policies, or that perhaps they are by nature individualistic and 
value self-help. 
4.3 Unemployment 
Is unemployment an important determinant of preferences over redistribution, after controlling 
for income? Table 6 reports the estimated effect of a dummy variable UnemplPast, which is unity 
when the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past five years. The estimated 
coefficient is positive, and is both statistically and economically significant. 
For expected unemployment, we created a binary variable UnemplFuture, which equals unity 
if the respondent answered affirmatively to the question: “Do you think either you or anyone in 
your family is going to be unemployed within two years?” The coefficient of this variable also 
turned out to be positive and significant at the 1% significant level. 
Thus, for both variables, the marginal effect is estimated to be about 8%. That is, if the 
respondent experienced unemployment in the recent past, or is expecting to do so in the near 
future, the predicted probability that he or she supports more redistribution is about 8% higher 
than otherwise. This is quantitatively important. It largely offsets the marginal effect of moving 
from the lowest income group to the highest (which is –10%). Taken at face value, this implies 
that to keep unchanged some newly unemployed person’s opinion about redistribution, he/she 
must be compensated for his/her household income by an amount of that order (for instance, the 
difference between the average incomes of the lowest income group and the highest is roughly 
equal to $100,000). UnemplPast and UnemplFuture are different variables. UnemplFuture 
takes its highest value (about 50%) for the 50s age group, although the average value of 
UnemplFuture is 38% for the whole sample. On the other hand, UnemplPast does not change 
very much by age group. The coefficient of correlation between UnemplPast and 
UnemplFuture is 0.212. 
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We have seen that even after controlling for current income and wealth, unemployment exerts 
a sizeable influence on preferences concerning redistribution. An implication is that the 
measurement of welfare loss using only current income or consumption may be biased 
downwards. Empirical results that are consistent with this point have already been obtained by 
researchers on subjective measures of well-being, such as happiness or life satisfaction (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002b, Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004). 
One can think of two explanations for unemployment’s being an important factor 
independently of income. First, unemployment may be accompanied by only a small reduction in 
current income but a large reduction in lifetime income. This could occur for someone who 
recently experienced unemployment if the wage profile of the former job was much steeper than 
that of the current job, with the change in the current wage level being rather small. Secondly, 
unemployment can involve not only a monetary loss but also serious psychological shocks, such 
as the loss of self-confidence and the loss of attachment to a workplace. Later, we examine these 
two possibilities by controlling for changes in consumption and income. 
4.4 Unemployment for young and old 
The cost of losing a job may not be the same across age groups. In particular, since the elderly are 
more likely to retire, they probably do not consider the effect of unemployment (be it monetary or 
psychological) as seriously as do younger persons. We now examine this by interacting the 
unemployment variables with age dummies. 
The estimation result in Table 7 is roughly consistent with our conjecture. Of the respondents 
who were recently unemployed, only those in their twenties (for whom UnP_20s is unity) have a 
strong tendency to approve more redistribution. Its coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% 
level, and the estimated marginal effect is 21.3% (the base group is people of any age with no 
recent experience of unemployment). Turning next to those who are expecting unemployment, we 
found that people in their thirties and forties tend to favor greater redistribution of income, with 
the latter age group having a larger marginal effect (19%). People in their fifties and sixties show 
 16
no inclination to accept more redistribution, even if they were recently unemployed or expect to 
be. 
We examine this issue further by comparing the results across two income groups, the wealthy 
and the poor. In the second column of Table 7, we estimated the same model as previously but 
using only respondents with household income below the 50th percentile in the sample. Table 7 
reveals that, among the recently unemployed, income redistribution policy was supported by 
people in their twenties and (to a lesser extent) by those in their fifties. On the other hand, 
expected unemployment has no significant effect on any age group, although the marginal effect 
for those in their forties is rather large and on the borderline of significance at the 10% level. 
The third column of Table 7 reports the estimates for those above the 50th percentile of 
household income. Despite a quite large positive marginal effect of UnP_20s (32%), experiences 
of unemployment are not statistically significant for all age groups. The estimated effects of 
future unemployment for those in their thirties and forties have economically important 
magnitudes, and the effect of the latter is also statistically significant. 
In sum, regardless of income, it appears that for the elderly, neither expected nor experienced 
unemployment has any effect on preferences for redistributive policy. Costs of being unemployed 
differ across age groups. As suggested before, the reason may be that, since elderly people are 
retiring anyway, neither their lifetime income nor their psychology is affected by unemployment. 
This is interesting because, as we have seen, aging itself has a strong positive correlation with 
approval for redistribution. 
Meanwhile, estimated effects of pure age dummies on the dependent variable show distinct 
patterns across income groups. Comparing the estimation results for rich and poor in Table 7, we 
find that only in the low-income sample are age dummies positively and significantly correlated 
with the dependent variable, entirely as expected: since the relatively poor elderly have few 
prospects of upward mobility, it is natural that they support extensive redistribution of income. 
Finally, women differ in their attitudes towards redistribution by income group. The third 
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column of Table 7 reports that rich women have a rather strong aversion to more income 
redistribution: among the higher income group, a married (resp. a single) woman is predicted to 
be 14.7% (resp. 23.2%) less likely than a married man to agree to such a scheme, whereas the 
second column of Table 7 indicates that among the lower income group, there is little difference 
between the genders. 
We do not know why rich women are more negative about redistributive policies than are rich 
men. As shown, marital status is estimated to be irrelevant (unlike in the US, according to Edlund 
and Pande, 2002). As discussed earlier, in other developed countries women are found to be in 
sympathy for income redistribution and the welfare state in general. 
4.5 Changes in income and consumption 
Earlier, we suggested that unemployment involves more than a monetary loss, and may include 
psychological shocks. However, it could be that the unemployment variables represent variations 
in expected future income or consumption (perhaps they obtain new information from the 
experience and adjust their own economic expectations), and that such variations are not well 
captured by current income, which is measured in absolute terms. If so, we should not interpret 
the significance of the unemployment variables (after controlling for current income) as evidence 
that the unemployed suffer a nonmonetary loss. 
To examine this issue, we created the variable ConsChange, which takes five distinct values 
(–7, –2.5, 0, 2.5, 7). It is based on our survey question about the percentage change in 
consumption between the previous year and the year before. We also constructed an analogous 
variable for past income variation, IncChange. The result in Table 8 suggests that a change in 
consumption is negatively correlated with the dependent variable, whereas a change in income is 
not. 
We also included dummies for expected income changes in the coming five years. FIncStable 
(resp. FIncUp) equals unity if the respondent says income will be stable (resp. rising), and zero 
otherwise. The result in Table 8 implies that people who expect a stable or rising income are 
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relatively negative about redistribution compared to those who expect a fall in income. 
We see that even after controlling for these variables, the coefficient of past unemployment is 
still large and positive, although that of future unemployment is no longer statistically significant. 
This result is consistent with the view that there exist not only pecuniary but also psychological 
costs of unemployment. 
4.6 Mobility 
Even the poor may be hostile to redistribution if they believe strongly that social mobility is 
sufficiently high. The rich may demand more redistribution today if they expect to fall down the 
income ladder in the near future. We now examine what our data has to say on this issue. 
A binary variable PoorGotRich equals unity if the respondent agreed with the view that “in 
the past five years the poor have had a greater chance of getting rich.” Likewise, RichGotPoor is 
a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent thinks “in the past five years the rich have 
had a greater probability of getting poor”. 
Table 8 shows that the coefficients of these variables are estimated to be negative and positive, 
respectively. In this sense, those who feel that upward social mobility has recently increased tend 
to oppose more redistribution. More downward social mobility leads people to approve greater 
redistribution. That is, social mobility and income redistribution are perceived to be substitutes. 
Nevertheless, these two estimates are not statistically significant. 
Unlike a change in general social mobility, increased poverty turned out to be quite important. 
MorePoor is a dummy that indicates whether the respondent feels the incidence of homelessness 
and/or family poverty has increased in the past five years. It has a marginal effect of 13.4%, and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
An interpretation of this finding is that people extract signals of mobility more easily and 
impressively from a change in extreme poverty than from a change in general social mobility. 
Another explanation, based on externalities, is that a rise in general poverty makes currently 
well-off people fear social unrest and crimes, thereby inducing them to vote for alleviating 
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poverty by redistribution. Although the rich will not be direct beneficiaries of such a policy, they 
will benefit from it indirectly. On the other hand, greater general downward mobility, as distinct 
from more poverty, is perhaps not sufficiently strong or impressive for this sort of mechanism to 
take effect. 
Incidentally, in estimates not reported here, we found no significant correlation between the 
dependent variable and indices of personal mobility (as defined by the difference in (1) one’s own 
educational level and that of one’s parents and (2) the subjective evaluation of one’s current living 
standards and those of one’s childhood). In addition, we could not reject the null hypothesis that 
subjective evaluation of current living standards has a zero coefficient, even at the 10% 
significance level. 
4.7 The rich and the poor 
Table 8 also reports estimation results for two income groups, namely those below and those 
above the 50th percentile of household income. That attitudes of women and the effect of aging 
are different across income groups has already been discussed. The self-employment dummy is 
significant only in the sample for the rich. The two unemployment variables have opposite 
effects: only past unemployment is significant among the poor, whereas among the well-off it is 
future unemployment that is important. 
Among the rich, the increase in consumption is negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable and is quite significant, while it is not so in the lower-income group. One explanation 
relates to liquidity constraints: perhaps many high-income households do not face a liquidity 
constraint, and so a recent change in their consumption level could reflect an unexpected change 
in future income. On the other hand, the relatively poor probably confront a severe liquidity 
constraint, and thus a change in consumption would reflect to a large extent a previously 
anticipated current income shock. 
Concerning social mobility and redistributive policy, the estimation results for both income 
groups are generally the same as those for the whole sample. 
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4.8 Economic inequalities 
We have already seen in our descriptive statistics that many respondents think that economic 
inequalities of one kind or another have increased in the past few years. Are these perceptions 
directly related to preferences over income redistribution? The first column of Table 9 shows that 
the recognition of a rise in income inequality has a large and positive coefficient. This may be 
because inequality simply offends people’s sense of equity. For instance, Alesina, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2001) show that the subjective well-being of a leftist person is negatively affected 
by greater income inequality. Alternatively, it could be that people interpret greater inequality as a 
rise in income risk, and hence desire more redistribution to prepare for this increased uncertainty. 
We found other kinds of inequalities to be insignificant.10 
4.9 Altruism and reasons for unemployment 
The next issue we examine is the effect of people’s perceptions about the causes of the recent rise 
in unemployment in Japan. If unemployment is perceived to be largely involuntary, then people 
may think it desirable that the government should engage in more redistribution of income. We 
created four binary variables to represent four different views concerning the causes of rising 
unemployment: the unemployment rate has risen because (1) “more people have difficulty 
handling new technologies” (NotAdapt); (2) “there are not enough jobs” (NoJobs); (3) “people 
are lazier and less competent than they were before” (LazyInabil); and (4) “welfare benefits 
became too generous”(BenDepend). 
The first two of these essentially characterize unemployment as “involuntary”, and so we 
expect them to have positive coefficients in our model. The last two are clearly less sympathetic 
to the unemployed. We thus expect the coefficient of each to have a negative sign. We found that 
none of these dummies were statistically significant, although the signs were as expected (see the 
                                                     
10 The conclusion regarding the effect of various inequalities on perceptions remains the same when we estimate each 
of these subjective variables, not simultaneously (as in the text), but separately (not shown). In that case, however, such 
variables as ConsChange and FIncStable, which becomes insignificant in Table 9 (due probably to collinearity with 
various subjective variables), turn out statistically significant again, as in Table 8. 
 21
second column of Table 9). 
Next, we examine the effect of altruism. The dummy variable HelpOthers takes unity if the 
respondent agreed with the idea that “less fortunate people should be helped by society.” Not 
surprisingly, these people proved quite supportive of greater redistribution. Its marginal effect is 
larger than that of any other variable analyzed. Note that quite a high percentage of respondents 
(67%) expressed altruism. 
However, the term altruism may not be entirely appropriate for this variable, because it can be 
an indicator of the self-interest of the rich who fear negative externalities (such as social unrest 
triggered by a worsening economic situation). In the face of rising inequality or poverty, the 
wealthy may rationally seek greater redistribution of income to alleviate adverse externalities. 
We should generally be careful not to give causal interpretations of results for subjective 
explanatory variables (as opposed to the cases of such exogenous variables as age, gender, risk 
aversion and possibly education or income too). A better and safer interpretation would be that 
these subjective opinions about society largely reflect individual specific fixed effects and help 
predict our dependent variable. The large coefficient of, say, HelpOthers is not surprising, 
because for some people, altruism may be largely synonymous with redistribution from rich to 
poor. Furthermore, the estimated marginal effect of such a variable would probably be reduced if 
we could obtain a panel dataset and control for personal fixed effects11.. The same point would 
apply to other subjective variables, to varying degrees.  
 
4.10 Norms and realities 
Table 9 also includes the estimated effects of the discrepancy between norms and realities 
concerning equality of opportunities. FamilyNR equals unity if the respondent agreed that “one’s 
family background should not be an important determinant of success in society, but in reality is”. 
MobilNR is a dummy that indicates whether the respondent thinks “upward social mobility 
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should be high, but in reality is not”. These two variables had reasonably large estimated marginal 
effects and positive signs, indicating that the gap between the norms and realities regarding “equal 
opportunities for all” is important. Of the two, however, only MobilNR is statistically significant. 
5. Conclusion 
Using an original dataset, we investigated the determinants of individual preferences over income 
redistribution in Japan. Although income level is negatively correlated with support for 
redistribution, there are other important factors, which relate to dynamics and uncertainty such as 
income risk. Even after controlling for income, risk-averse individuals, and those who expect to 
be unemployed in the future, show a strong tendency to support more redistribution. However, it 
appears that the elderly do not consider the effect of unemployment as seriously as do younger 
persons, probably because the elderly are going to retire anyway. As for pure effects of aging and 
mobility, since the relatively poor elderly have few prospects of upward mobility, they have good 
reasons to, and indeed do, support extensive income redistribution. Redistribution policy targeted 
at aged people will be supported. Women oppose more redistribution, in contrast to the case in 
other developed countries.12 Unlike changes in general social mobility, increased poverty is 
estimated to have a quite important influence. 
Altruism is also a key factor, but perhaps the term altruism is not entirely appropriate for the 
corresponding variable, for even if the rich are not the direct beneficiaries of redistribution, 
supporting such a policy is consistent with their own self-interest if they fear negative 
externalities such as social unrest. A rise in income inequality has a positive impact on approval of 
redistribution. The discrepancy between the norms and realities regarding equality of opportunity 
influences people’s preferences for redistributive policies. Although in this paper we have 
analyzed the characteristics of supporters of a stronger redistribution system, future research is 
                                                                                                                                                           
11   See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for this and related points. 
12  More precisely, we have seen that it is women in the upper-half income group who oppose greater redistribution. 
Interestingly, using the same dataset we found elsewhere that women tend to be more critical of greater income 
inequality, compared to men (Tomioka and Ohtake, 2004). Thus, it could be that women support the equlization of 
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needed to determine the optimal degree of progressivity in income tax. 
                                                                                                                                                           
before-taz income but not that of after-tax income through forced redistribution by tax and social security. 
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Table 1. Household income quartiles and support for redistribution (%) 
 More Redistribution  
Income quartiles Oppose Neutral Support Total 
1 11.25 30.63 58.12 100 
2 13.6 29.39 57.02 100 
3 20.11 31.22 48.68 100 
4(Top) 22.81 35.31 41.88 100 
Total 15.87 31.67 52.46 100 
 
Table 2. Age groups and support for redistribution (%) 
 More Redistribution  
Age group Oppose Neutral Support Total 
20s 20.65 35.87 43.48 100 
30s 14.59 32.62 52.79 100 
40s 19.44 35.42 45.14 100 
50s 13.59 29.08 57.34 100 
60s 10.86 24.57 64.57 100 
Total 15.87 31.67 52.46 100 
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Table 3. Gender and support for redistribution (%) 
 More Redistribution  
Gender Oppose Neutral Support Total 
Female 15.69 36.03 48.28 100 
Male 16.02 28.04 55.94 100 
Total 15.87 31.67 52.46 100 
 
Table 4. Employment status and support for redistribution (%) 
 More Redistribution  
 Oppose Neutral Support Total 
Not Unemployed 16.13 32.1 51.77 100 
Unemployed 6.06 15.15 78.79 100 
Total 15.87 31.67 52.46 100 
 28
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of all variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Redistr 1050 0.520 0.500 IncChange 1050 –0.86 3.621 
MaleNoMarried 1050 0.135 0.342 ConsChange 1050 0.67 3.805 
FemMarried 1050 0.28 0.449 FIncStable 1050 0.293 0.456 
FemNoMarried 1050 0.113 0.317 FIncUp 1050 0.197 0.398 
age30s 1050 0.186 0.389 PoorGotRich 1046 0.102 0.302 
age40s 1050 0.235 0.424 RichGotPoor 1044 0.562 0.496 
age50s 1050 0.291 0.454 MorePoor 1047 0.852 0.355 
age60s 1050 0.137 0.344 IncomIneq 1042 0.663 0.473 
College 1050 0.318 0.466 WealthIneq 1037 0.539 0.499 
GradSchool 1050 0.025 0.156 IneqSchool 1041 0.23 0.421 
Estate 1050 2.39 2.998 IneqPart 1024 0.502 0.5 
FAsset 1050 10.28 11.60 IneqFamily 1031 0.206 0.404 
HIncClass2 1050 0.326 0.469 IncomIneqFut 1044 0.753 0.432 
HIncClass3 1050 0.267 0.442 WealthIneqFut 1039 0.621 0.485 
RiskAvs 1050 0.491 0.201 IneqSchoolFut 1043 0.268 0.443 
SelfEmployed 1050 0.082 0.275 IneqPartFut 1041 0.485 0.5 
UnemplPast 1050 0.153 0.361 IneqFamilyFut 1034 0.203 0.402 
UnemplFut 1050 0.382 0.486 NotAdapt 1040 0.546 0.498 
UnP_age20 1050 0.035 0.183 LazyInabil 1045 0.5 0.5 
UnP_age30 1050 0.035 0.183 NoJobs 1049 0.867 0.34 
UnP_age40 1050 0.026 0.159 BenDepend 1043 0.288 0.453 
UnP_age50 1050 0.034 0.18 HelpOthers 1047 0.679 0.467 
UnP_age60 1050 0.025 0.156 FamilyNR 1045 0.247 0.431 
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UnF_age20 1050 0.065 0.247 MobilNR 1046 0.489 0.5 
UnF_age30 1050 0.073 0.26      
UnF_age40 1050 0.064 0.245      
UnF_age50 1050 0.131 0.338      
UnF_age60 1050 0.048 0.214         
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Table 6. Estimation results for basic model 
 Marginal Effect Std. Err 
MaleNoMarried 0.647 0.058 
FemMarried –0.063* 0.038 
FemNoMarried –0.022 0.059 
age30s 0.114 ** 0.053  
age40s 0.065   0.057  
age50s 0.207 *** 0.060  
age60s 0.272 *** 0.057  
College 0.020   0.035  
GradSchool –0.119   0.104  
Estate –0.003   0.006  
FAsset –0.004 ** 0.002  
HIncClass2 –0.019   0.037  
HIncClass3 –0.105 ** 0.047  
RiskAvs 0.200 ** 0.079  
SelfEmployed –0.079   0.057  
UnemplPast 0.081 * 0.045  
UnemplFuture 0.083 *** 0.032  
    
Number of obs 1122  
Pseudo R2 0.0515  
Loglikelihood –7360.682   
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 7. Estimation results for models with interaction of unemployment experience and 
age 
  All   Poor   Rich   
  Marginal Effect Std. Err Marginal Effect Std. Err Marginal Effect Std. Err
MaleNoMarried 0.068 0.059 0.090  0.066 –0.059 0.116
FemMarried –0.066 * 0.039 0.011 0.052 –0.147*** 0.054
FemNoMarried –0.021   0.060 0.055 0.066 –0.232* 0.112
age30s 0.111   0.066 0.108   0.080 0.075 0.154
age40s 0.046   0.073 0.139   0.091 –0.138 0.132
age50s 0.224 *** 0.071 0.217 ** 0.085 0.113 0.139
age60s 0.310 *** 0.065 0.317 *** 0.072 0.186 0.162
College 0.024   0.035 0.022   0.047 0.055 0.055
GradSchool –0.101   0.104 –0.047   0.146 –0.143 0.140
Estate –0.003   0.006 –0.004   0.010 0.0026 0.007
FAsset –0.004 ** 0.002 –0.004 * 0.002 –0.0027 0.002
HIncClass2 –0.014   0.037        
HIncClass3 –0.095 ** 0.047        
Household Inc    0.001   0.013 –0.022** 0.01
RiskAvs 0.203 *** 0.079 0.176 * 0.104 0.201* 0.120
SelfEmployed –0.078   0.057 –0.028   0.075 –0.189** 0.0860
UnP_age20s 0.213 ** 0.079 0.216 ** 0.079 0.323 0.181
UnP_age30s 0.044   0.091 0.100   0.104 –0.112 0.159
UnP_age40s –0.012   0.096 0.042   0.135 –0.072 0.123
UnP_age50s 0.091   0.084 0.177 * 0.092 –0.09 0.150
UnP_age60s 0.063   0.121 0.126   0.127 –0.020 0.294
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UnF_age20s 0.013   0.085 –0.038   0.102 0.125 0.142
UnF_age30s 0.119 * 0.061 0.086   0.067 0.216 0.139
UnF_age40s 0.195 *** 0.064 0.146   0.084 0.249** 0.102
UnF_age50s 0.049   0.055 0.073   0.080 0.041 0.080
UnF_age60s –0.021   0.086 –0.120   0.109 0.142 0.159
Number of obs 1122  661  461   
Pseudo R2 0.0564  0.0459  0.0946  
Loglikelihood –732.895   –431.158   –287.48951   
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 8. Estimation results for models with perspective on mobility 
  All   Poor  Rich   
  Marginal Effect Std. ErrMarginal Effect Std. Err Marginal Effect Std. Err
MaleNoMarried 0.071 0.061 0.101 0.069 –0.052 0.118
FemMarried –0.084** 0.040 –0.001 0.054 –0.191*** 0.058
FemNoMrried –0.067 0.061 0.063 0.070 –0.242* 0.113
age30s 0.142 ** 0.055 0.152 ** 0.061 0.092  0.131 
age40s 0.071   0.060 0.177 ** 0.070 –0.139  0.126 
age50s 0.216 *** 0.065 0.269 *** 0.066 0.038  0.129 
age60s 0.295 *** 0.059 0.310 *** 0.067 0.165  0.144 
College 0.034   0.037 0.032   0.050 0.052  0.061 
GradSchool –0.148   0.111 –0.077   0.163 –0.173  0.148 
Estate –0.004   0.006 –0.011   0.010 0.005  0.008 
FAsset –0.003 * 0.002 –0.003   0.003 –0.002  0.002 
HIncClass2 –0.013   0.039         
HIncClass3 –0.089 * 0.049         
Houseinc    0.004   0.013 –0.021** 0.010 
RiskAvs 0.141 * 0.081 0.116   0.109 0.117  0.123 
SelfEmployed –0.111 * 0.059 –0.069   0.076 –0.183* 0.087 
UnemplPast 0.096 * 0.049 0.169 *** 0.057 –0.039  0.083 
UnemplFuture 0.054   0.037 0.016   0.045 0.112* 0.058 
IncChange –0.004   0.005 0.000   0.006 –0.005  0.009 
ConsChange –0.010 ** 0.005 –0.004   0.006 –0.020*** 0.007 
FincStable –0.076 * 0.039 –0.073   0.048 –0.060  0.066 
FincUp –0.034   0.046 –0.077   0.059 0.023  0.073 
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PoorGotRich –0.072   0.058 –0.072   0.073 –0.108  0.088 
RichGotPoor 0.025   0.034 0.034   0.043 0.027  0.054 
MorePoor 0.134 *** 0.044 0.142 ** 0.061 0.150** 0.067 
Number of obs 1043   607  436  
Pseudo R2 0.072   0.059  0.1197  
Loglikelihood –670.496   –390.550   –264.239   
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 9. Estimation results for the models with inequality and unemployment perspectives 
 (1)  (2)  
  Marginal Effect Std. Err Marginal Effect Std. Err 
IncChange –0.007 0.005 –0.001 0.005 
ConsChange –0.007 0.005 –0.008 0.005 
FincStable –0.064 0.041 –0.053 0.041 
FincUp –0.031 0.047 0.011 0.046 
IncomIneq 0.101** 0.049    
WealthIneq –0.004 0.046    
IneqSchool –0.022 0.051    
IneqPart 0.006 0.043    
IneqFamily 0.067 0.05    
IncomIneqFut –0.042 0.056    
WealthIneqFut –0.038 0.047    
IneqSchoolFut –0.025 0.047    
IneqPartFu 0.030 0.044    
IneqFamilyFut 0.035 0.05    
NotAdapt    0.007  0.032  
LazyInabil    –0.011  0.036  
NoJobs    0.071  0.051  
BenDepend    –0.023  0.040  
HelpOthers    0.292 *** 0.038  
FamilyNR    0.059  0.040  
MobilNR    0.071 ** 0.034  
Number of obs 902  1030  
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Pseudo R2 0.0698  0.127  
Loglikelihood –581.303  –622.455  
Note: In addition to those shown in the Table, the estimated models include regressors used in the model of Table 6, 
(namely, MaleNoMarried, FemMarried, FemNoMarried, age30s, age40s, age50s, age60s, College, GradSchool, Estate, 
FAsset, HIncClass2, HIncClass3, RiskAvs, SelfEmployed, UnemplPast, UnemplFuture). *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Redistr: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the government should engage in more 
redistribution of income from rich to poor. The original survey question is: “If the 
government was going to implement the following policies, would you support or 
oppose them? 1. Increasing redistribution of income from rich to poor using tax and 
social security system.” Answers were selected from a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=Support; 
2 = Some support; 3 = Undecided; 4 = Rather opposed; 5 = Oppose. Our dependent 
variable equals unity if the respondent chooses 1 or 2. 
age20s: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is in his or her 20s. Similarly for 30s, 40s, 50s and 60s. 
MaleNoMarried: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is a male and not married. 
FemMarried: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is a female and married. 
FemNoMarried: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is a female and not married. 
DivSep: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is either divorced or separated. 
College: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is a college graduate. 
GradSchool: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has a degree from a graduate school. 
Estate: real estate owned by the household, in millions of Yen. 
FAsset: financial assets of the household, in millions of Yen. 
HIncClassN: Nth household-income class, where N is either 1, 2 or 3 where 3 is the highest. 
HousInc: household income, in millions of Yen. 
RiskAvs: this variable is based on the answer to the following survey question: “What is the 
lowest percentage of rainfall forecast that usually makes you take an umbrella with you 
when going out?” and is specifically constructed as 1 – (the suggested percentage)/100. 
SelfEmployed: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is self-employed. 
ConsChange: rate of change in the respondent’s consumption last year relative to the year before. 
IncChange: rate of change in the respondent’s income last year relative to the year before. 
FIncUp: dummy equal to 1 if respondent expects household income to be rising during the 
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coming five years. 
FIncStable: dummy equal to 1 if respondent expects household income to be stable during the 
coming five years. 
UnemplPast: dummy equal to 1 if respondent was unemployed in the past five years. 
UnemplFuture: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is expecting to be unemployed within two years. 
UnP_age30s: interaction of UnemplPast and age30s ; thus it equals unity if respondent is in 
his/her 30s and became unemployed in the past five years; similarly for other age 
groups. 
UnF_age30s: interaction of UnemplFuture and age30s; similarly for other age groups. 
Unemployed: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is currently unemployed. 
Rich: dummy equal to 1 if respondent’s household income is equal to or above 50th percentile. 
PoorGotRich: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks upward mobility has increased in the last 
five years. 
RichGotPoor: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks downward mobility has increased in the 
last five years. 
MorePoor: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the incidence of homelessness and family 
poverty has increased in the last five years. 
IncomIneq: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that income inequality has increased in the 
last five years. 
WealthIneq: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that wealth inequality has increased in the 
last five years 
IneqSchool: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that inequality across different educational 
backgrounds has increased in the last five years. 
IneqPart: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that income inequality between full-time 
workers and part-time workers has increased in the last five years. 
IneqFamily: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that inequality across different family 
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backgrounds has increased in the last five years. 
IncomeIneqFut: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that income inequality will increase 
within five years. 
WealthIneqFut: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that wealth inequality will increase 
within five years. 
IneqSchoolFut: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that inequality across different 
educational backgrounds will increase within five years. 
IneqPartFut: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that income inequality between full-time 
workers and part-time workers will increase within five years. 
IneqFamilyFut: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that inequality across different family 
backgrounds will increase within five years. 
NotAdapt: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the unemployment rate rose because some 
people could not keep up with or handle new technology. 
LazyInabil: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the unemployment rate rose because 
people have become lazier and less competent. 
NoJobs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the unemployment rate rose because there 
have not been enough jobs. 
BenDepend: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the unemployment rate rose because 
welfare benefits have been too generous. 
HelpOthers: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that less fortunate people should be helped 
by society. 
FamilyNR: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that economic inequality due to different 
family backgrounds should not be large but it actually is. 
MobilNR: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that social mobility should be high but is 
actually low. 
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Figure 1. Income groups and attitude towards strengthening income redistribution 
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